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NOTES
IS "DILIGENT PROSECUTION OF AN ACTION IN A COURT"
REQUIRED TO PREEMPT CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE MA-
JOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES?
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, mainly in reaction to
political pressures stemming from concerns about the degrading
environment, Congress began to address the environmental and
human health problems caused by growing urbanization and
industrial development.' By enacting new and amending exist-
ing national environmental statutes using novel implementation
and enforcement strategies,2 Congress hoped to protect the envi-
ronment and human health better than it had under previous
laws.3 Congress gave authority to private citizens to assume the
government's enforcement position in order to help realize the
desired goals.4 The statutory provisions conferring this private
1. See JEFFREY G. MILLER, ENVIRONMfENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SU1TS: PRI-
VATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 3-4 (1987).
2. Congress's various implementation and enforcement strategies in the federal
environmental statutes are considered through a taxonomic approach and analyzed
at length in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A
COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 537-975 (1992). The authors use a tax-
onomy of environmental statute types so that readers may understand better the
issues addressed by the environmental statutes and may analyze the statutes with
improved depth, breadth, and speed. See id. at 535.
3. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 3-4; Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 837-38 (1985); see generally Clean Air
Act of 1955 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994) (stating the congressional finding that
"pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing
use of motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and
welfare," and listing as one purpose of the law "to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare").
4. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 4; Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen
As Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some
Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 366-67
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enforcement authority are called "citizen suit provisions."5
Since 1970, Congress has included citizen suit provisions in
almost all of the new national environmental statutes and major
amendments.' Congress used the language of the first modern
provision, section 304 of the Clean Air Act,7 as a model for sub-
sequent provisions.8 Citizen suit provisions have provided an
important and frequently used enforcement tool, allowing private
parties to have significant influence in environmental enforce-
ment actions and providing assistance to agencies that have
limited resources.' The initiation of a citizen suit, however, may
create problems for enforcement agencies by interfering with the
agency's enforcement efforts and discretion.'0 Congress foresaw
this problem. In fact, opponents of the provisions succeeded in
including statutory limitations that restrict a private party's
ability to bring a citizen suit under certain circumstances." One
statutory restriction, precluding citizen suits when an agency has
already brought and is diligently prosecuting its own action, has
(1988); Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Administrative Discretion:
When Should Government Enforcement Bar a Citizen Suit?, NATL ENVTL. ENFORCE-
MENT J., Apr. 1995, at 3.
5. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 835; see also, e.g., Clean Air Act of
1955 § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (permitting citizen suits against both private
and governmental parties for emissions violations).
6. The only major national environmental statutes that do not authorize citizen
suits are the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d)
(1994), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136(y) (1994). See MILLER, supra note 1, at 5-6; Blomquist, supra note 4, at
367; Stephen Fotis, Comment, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 136 (stating that, since their inclusion in
the Clean Air Act of 1970, "citizen suit provisions have become routine features of
federal environmental laws").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
8. Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act, "Congress [has] exhibited a tenden-
cy to literally 'lift! [the] section" and place it in all new statutes and major amend-
ments. Snook, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of
Federal Pollution Control Law, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309,
10,311 (1983)).
9. See Snook, supra note 4, at 3.
10. See id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 42-54; see also, e.g., Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970 § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1994) (requiring citizen suit plaintiffs to
give notice 60 days before filing a citizen suit and precluding citizen suits if an
agency has commenced and is prosecuting its own action).
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generated much litigation 2 and is the focus of this Note.
After examining the current interpretations of the diligent
prosecution restrictions and their respective strengths and weak-
nesses, this Note considers alternatives and, then proposes a so-
lution. This Note first briefly discusses the background and his-
tory of private enforcement, including the current statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of the modern national environmen-
tal statutes and their citizen suit provisions. Next, this Note de-
scribes the confusion that exists among the various United States
Courts of Appeals over the proper interpretation of the terms "in
a court" and "diligence" contained in the diligent prosecution
limitation on citizen suits. This Note then proposes that Con-
gress amend the current statutory language so that courts are
more clearly directed to permit diligent prosecution of agency ac-
tions to preempt citizen suits. This Note explains how such an
approach effectively meets the overall goals of the statutes and
protects important policy considerations. Alternatively, in the
absence of a statutory amendment, this Note proposes a judicial
standard for determining when diligent prosecution of agency
actions suffices to preempt citizen suits. The proposed standard
optimally balances the beneficial policy goals of preemption by
agency actions and the arguments regarding statutory language.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PRIVATE PARTY ENFORCEMENT
"Private enforcement of federal statutes is not a new concept,
unique to environmental law."" In the Anglo-American legal
system, the concept of shared enforcement responsibilities be-
tween public officials and private citizens can be traced back over
12. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 901. Although the citizen suit provi-
sion was invoked infrequently during the 1970s, see id. at 835, hundreds of lawsuits
have been filed nationwide since 1980 under the Clean Water Act alone, typically by
environmentally conscious groups such as the Sierra Club. See RUSSELL S. FRYE,
THE CLEAN WATER AcT COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 80-81 (1989); MILLER, supra note 1,
at vii.
13. MILLER, supra note 1, at 1. For a thorough discussion of the history of private
enforcement in both the American and English legal systems, see Boyer &
Meidinger, supra note 3, at 946-57, and Note, The History and Development of Qui
Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81.
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600 years.'4 In 1388, England passed a water pollution statute
in response to the public health problem created by the uncon-
trolled dumping of garbage into "Ditches, Rivers, and other Wa-
ters."5 The 1388 statute had a dual enforcement system em-
powering both public officials and others who felt "grieved" to
commence enforcement proceedings." This practice of sharing
enforcement power continued through the years in England by
allowing private parties to bring qui tam actions. 7 Despite lim-
ited practicality," the custom continued throughout the develop-
ment of English law and well into the nineteenth century."8
Eventually, English citizens began to abuse their private enforce-
ment authority; this abuse, combined with the action's limited
usefulness, led England ultimately to abolish qui tam actions."
"[Tihe American experience with qui tam proceedings general-
ly paralleled that of England."2' In fact, the American colonies
adopted the concept and it continued well into the twentieth
century;22 however, some states experienced problems similar to
those that occurred in England and some eventually passed pro-
cedural curbs on the commencement of qui tam suits.2 None-
theless, in general, American judicial attitudes toward qui tam
14. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 947.
15. 12 Rich. 2, ch. 13 (1388) (Eng.). The medieval English statute is quoted at
length in Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 947 n.279.
16. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 947 n.279.
17. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 363. Qui tam is an abbreviation of the Latin
phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hoc parte sequitur, which
means, "[w]ho sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself." BLAcK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 364.
19. See id.
20. See id. The private enforcers in England came to be viewed not as "legitimate
spokespersons for the public interest but rather as 'unprincipled pettifoggers' whose
office [was] a nuisance and 'an instrument of individual extortion, caprice and
tyranny'." Id. (quoting Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 954, quoting 2 L.
RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM
1750, at 139 (1982)).
21. Id. at 364-65 (citing Note, supra note 13, at 97).
22. See Note, supra note 13, at 91-101.
23. See id. at 97-99. One technique for limiting qui tam suits was to label certain
actions "criminal" and then refuse to allow private parties to bring those actions. See
id. at 99.
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actions were mixed,' and the prevailing view by the middle of
the twentieth century was that "[a]s the public agencies became
more effective, the need for qui tam actions diminished."'
A resurgence of qui tam actions occurred during the 1970s
when concerned citizens and environmentalists attempted to
bring such actions26 under the provisions of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.27 Although the courts generally were not
receptive to the argument that the Rivers and Harbors Act im-
plicitly authorized private enforcement actions, 8 "the political
climate in the early 1970s ... fostered strong Congressional in-
terest in encouraging citizen participation in enforcement of
federal environmental laws." 9 Congress eventually codified this
interest through the citizen suit provisions of the modern envi-
ronmental statutes.30
CITIZEN SUIT STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Statutory Language
Growing from the tradition of qui tam actions,"' the first
modern citizen suit provision in an environmental statute 2 was
24. See id. at 100.
25. Id. at 101.
26. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 2, at 324; Fotis, supra note 6, at 132 n.20. The
citizens were concerned primaiily about the increasing levels of water pollution and
the failure of the environmental laws of the time to stop or control the increase. See
PLATER ET AL., supra note 2, at 322-27. The proponents of Rivers and Harbor Act
qui tam suits argued that the suits were proper because modern water pollution was
within the statutory reference to "refuse." See id. at 324-25; see also, e.g., Bass An-
gler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (1971) (com-
mencing a qui tam action against a defendant corporation for depositing refuse in
navigable waters).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1994).
28. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 366 (citations omitted).
29. Id.; see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 2, at 324 (stating that although most qui
tam suits were dismissed, some courts permitted such cases to be brought); compare
United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 7 (D. Minn. 1971)
(dismissing a Refuse Act qui tam suit), with Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California,
437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971) (allowing a Refuse Act qui tam suit).
30. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 366-67.
31. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Citizen enforcement actions greatly resemble government enforcement and qui tam
actions."); Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 844.
32. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 4; Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 844.
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section 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (CAA)."3
In subsequent environmental legislation, Congress tended to lift
the section out of the CAA and include it in new statutes and
amendments made to existing laws.34 In fact, many courts have
recognized the similarities between the statutes and have used
case law for the CAA as persuasive authority in interpreting the
language of the later statutes. 5 For this reason, and because
citizen suit enforcement has concentrated on the Clean Water
Act (CWA),3 s this Note considers and discusses the citizen suit
provisions of the CAA 7 and the CWA.31
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994).
34. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 339; Snook, supra note 4, at 4; see also, e.g.,
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (including a citizen suit
provision in the original version of the statute); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (adding citi-
zen suit provision through amendments to existing statute).
35. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the citizen suit provision language in the various environmental stat-
utes is either the same or similar and courts have interpreted the provisions identi-
cally despite slight differences in wording); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (Conrail) (finding the Clean Water Act (CWA)
citizen suit provision to be a "clear parallel" of section 304 of the CAA and finding
that the legislative history is similar in all significant respects) (citing Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); Student Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1534
n.8 (D.N.J. 1984) (citing the parallel between the CWA and the CAA citizen suit
provisions), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG); MILLER, supra note 1, at 7
("The citizen suit sections of the various environmental statutes are virtually iden-
tical, being patterned closely after Clean Air Act § 304 . . . . [Pirecedent under one
statute . . . clearly applies to others.").
36. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 11-14.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. The relevant portion of the CAA citizen suit provision provides:
(a) . . .
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to have violated ... or to be
in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter
or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, [or]
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure . . . to
perform any act or duty . . . not discretionary ... The district courts
shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce such an emission standard or limi-
tation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator ... and to apply
any appropriate civil penalties ....
(b) ...
No action may be commenced-
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Generally, when interpreting a statutory provision, the start-
ing point is the language of the statute itself.3 9 For this Note,
the specific language that will be analyzed is: "No action may be
commenced... if the [government] has comm enced and is dili-
gently prosecuting [an] action in a court."0 The meaning of the
statutory language or, more precisely, an indication of the con-
gressional purpose for including the language, may be obtained
by reviewing the provision's legislative history.4
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the viola-
tion ... or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting a civil action in a court of the United States, or a State to re-
quire compliance ... but in any such action in a court of the United
States any person may intervene as a matter of right.
Id. § 7604(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). In pertinent part, the CWA citizen suit provision
states:
(a)...
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
1319(g)(6) . . . any citizen may commence a civil action on his own be-
half-
(1) against any person . . .who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limi-
tation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure . . . to
perform any act or duty... which is not discretionary ... . The dis-
trict courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an effluent stan-
dard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act ... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties ....(b) ...
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation... or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance. .. but in any such action in a court of
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
Id. § 1365(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
39. "It is well settled that 'the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-
guage of the statute itself." Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994); accord 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B).
41. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1984) (stating that although
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A cursory review of the legislative history for the citizen suit
provision indicates that the suits were viewed as inexpensive
alternatives to government enforcement and as a means to en-
courage agencies to uphold the law.42 In fact, various courts
have found that in enacting the citizen suit provision, "Congress
made clear that citizen groups [we]re not to be treated as nui-
sances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in
the vindication of environmental interests." 3 Although a major-
ity of Congress believed citizen suits to be a beneficial advance
in enforcement of environmental laws, a close inspection of the
legislative record reveals that a minority did not look so kindly
upon granting such broad enforcement authority to mere private
citizens."
The majority position, aptly titled by one commentator as the
Expansionist Approach,45 viewed citizen suits as an aid to gov-
ernment enforcement. The majority advocated that citizen suits
properly act "to both goad the responsible agencies to more vig-
orous enforcement of the antipollution standards and, if the
agencies remained inert, to provide an alternative enforcement
mechanism." In addition, the followers of the Expansionist
"we are satisfied that the statutory language with which we deal has a plain and
unambiguous meaning[,1 . . . we now turn to the legislative history as an additional
tool of analysis"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 108 (stating that stat-
utory language must be regarded as conclusive, "[aibsent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention to the contrary"). But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26
(1977) (warning that "[r]eliance on legislative history in divining the intent of Con-
gress is . . . a step to be taken cautiously").
42. See 116 CONG. REC. 32,903, 32,926-27 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (stat-
ing that citizen suits would provide a valuable source of assistance to overworked
agencies); 116 CONG. REc. 32,919 (1970) (statement of Sen. Spong) (describing the
intent of the CAA provision as being to "complement and encourage the abatement
activities of governmental agencies").
43. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976), quoted in
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Conrail); see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 (stating that Congress envisioned that
citizen suits would play a supplementary role in enforcement); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that
Congress believed citizen suits could be helpful in detecting violations and bringing
them to the attention of the proper authorities).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
45. Snook, supra note 4, at 4.
46. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979); see S. REP.
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Approach justified citizen suits as providing assistance to over-
worked and underresourced agencies.'
The minority position, which has been called the Restrictive
Approach," viewed citizen suits as infringing upon agency
discretion.49 The advocates of this view thought that insisting
on the need for alternative private enforcement denigrated the
professionalism of responsible government agencies"o and the
granting of wide enforcement authority would flood the already
clogged courts and cause agencies to expend scarce resources on
frivolous claims.5'
These competing views shaped the ultimate citizen suit provi-
sion, which, as a compromise, allowed citizen suits but required
that specific limitations be satisfied.52 The diligent prosecution
restriction was one of these limitations.53 The legislative history
indicates that the purpose of the diligent prosecution limitation
was to ensure that the agency acted in a manner that protected
the citizens adequately.' 4 As for the exact language of the dili-
NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 33,104 (1970) (statement of Sen.
Hart); 116 CONG. REC. 32,902 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie); Snook, supra note
4, at 4-5.
47. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 4-5; Snook, supra note 4, at 5; cf 116 CONG.
REC. 32,927 (1970) ("[Ilt is too much to presume that, however well staffed or well
intentioned the[] enforcement agencies, they will be able to monitor [all] the poten-
tial violations . . . under [the] act.") (statement of Sen. Muskie).
48. See Snook, supra note 4, at 4.
49. See 116 CONG. EC. 32,925-26 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska); MILLER, su-
pra note 1, at 5; Snook, supra note 4, at 4-5; see also Doris K. Nagel, Comment,
Environmental Law-Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil Penalties, 36 KAN. L. REV.
529, 532 (1988) (pointing out that citizen suits were feared in part because of the
belief that a lack of a single controlling entity would result in haphazard application
of environmental laws).
50. See Snook, supra note 4, at 5 (citing Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of
Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,063,
10,064 n.11 (1984)).
51. See 116 CONG. REC. 32,925-26 (1970) ("The functioning of the department
could be interfered with, and its time and resources frittered away by responding to
these law suits.") (statement of Sen. Hruska).
52. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 5.
53. See id. at 4-5. Another major limitation was the notice and delay requirement.
See id. at 5; see also, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 304, 42 U.S.C. §
7604(b) (1994) (requiring citizen suit plaintiffs to give notice 60 days before filing
such a suit).
54. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
60 (1987) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, 36-39, 64 (1971), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL
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gent prosecution provision, particularly the terms "in a court"
and "diligence," the legislative history is silent.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Introduction
Most courts hearing a citizen suit case begin their analyses
with the proposition that the purpose of citizen suits is to "sup-
plement, not supplant," government enforcement,55 a view that
the Supreme Court has adopted." In. addition, when interpret-
ing the specific language of the diligent prosecution limitation,
courts usually ask the same two questions: first, what is an ac-
tion in a court, and second, what constitutes diligent prosecu-
tion?57 It is in their answers to these questions that judicial
opinions diverge greatly."
Despite the seemingly obvious requirement of a court for the
"action in a court" question,59 courts addressing the issue do
POLICY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1454-57, 1482 (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY])
(stating that citizen suits are proper when the agencies fail to exercise their enforce-
ment responsibility).
The purpose of the other primary limitation, the notice and delay provision, was
to provide an agency with the opportunity to consider the alleged problem and de-
cide whether the agency would address the concern by proceeding with its own ac-
tion. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 80 (1971) ("The time between notice and filing of
the action should give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on
the alleged violation."). Commentators have argued that the delay period is woefully
inadequate to allow for the filing of a case by the government. See MILLER, supra
note 1, at 45-49; Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 898 (arguing that unless the
government is on the verge of filing an action when the notice letter arrives, the 60
day delay is not a sufficient time period for the government to win the race to the
courthouse).
55. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d
124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60); see also Blomquist, su-
pra note 4, at 370; Snook, supra note 4, at 6.
56. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
57. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1987);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d
1131, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG).
58. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 901-05; Snook, supra note 4, at 6.
59. The statutes clearly state that the agency or state must be prosecuting an "ac-
tion in a court" for the action to bar a citizen suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994)
(emphasis added); accord 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994). But see Clean Water Act
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not agree whether a formal judicial proceeding is actually neces-
sary."0 The two conflicting interpretations that have developed
§ 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (1994) (amending the GWA in 1987 with a govern-
ment prosecution restriction on citizen suits but without the "in a court' language).
Congress included section 309(g) of the CWA, which addresses administrative penal-
ties, so that administrative penalty actions would preempt citizen suits seeking civil
penalties. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(ii), (g)(6)(B); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 99-1004,
at 133 (1986); Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 62 (1989); Mark S. Fisch, Note, The Judiciary Begins To
Erect Another Dam Against Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 22 STETSON L.
REV. 209, 214 n.33, 230 (1992). At first blush, section 1319(g)(6) appears to address
the topic of this Note (preemption of citizen suits by agency actions); this Note, how-
ever, argues that Congress should extend preclusion to all types of citizen suits, not
just actions for civil penalties.
Although some controversy exists regarding the scope of section 1319, the statu-
tory language, legislative history, and predominant opinion state that, when an al-
leged violator has paid administrative penalties, section 1319 bars only citizen suits
seeking civil penalties, or the civil penalty claims in multiple-claim citizen suits. See
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(ii), (g)(6)(B); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-1004, at 133 (1986)
("No one may bring an action to recover civil penalties under . . . [section 1365] for
any violation with respect to which the Administrator ... is diligently prosecuting
an administrative civil penalty action. [Tihis limitation would not apply to ... an
action seeking relief other than civil penalties (e.g., an injunction or declaratory
judgement).") (emphases added); Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885-87 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a citizen
suit seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and civil penalties was not barred by
an agency action that was not a penalty action); Coalition for a Liveable W. Side,
Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 830 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y..
1993) (finding that section 1319(g)(6) precluded only citizen suits seeking civil penal-
ties); Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. Bakaert Corp., 791 F. Supp. 769, 775 (W.D. Ark.
1992) (holding that prior EPA actions did not bar a citizen suit seeking declaratory
judgement, injunctive relief, and civil penalties because the agency actions were for
compliance and not for penalties). But see Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas,
Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995) (finding
that preclusion of only civil penalty citizen suits would lead to unreasonable results);
North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding that it would be "inconceivable" for section 1319 to preclude only citi-
zen suits seeking civil penalties); Fisch, supra, at 230-31 (assuming section 1319 ex-
tended to section 1365 but disregarding statutory language limiting its preclusion to
actions "under this subsection"-section 1319(g)-which applies only to administrative
penalty actions).
60. Compare Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that administrative agency actions can be equivalent to court actions so
long as certain requirements are met), with Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (Conrail) (holding that the statutory lan-
guage unambiguously requires a formal court proceeding), and Sierra Club v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a formal court
proceeding is required).
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among courts analyzing the issue are the Plain Language Ap-
proach and the Baughman Approach. Courts following the Plain
Language Approach find that the language unambiguously re-
quires a formal court proceeding to preclude a citizen suit;6
whereas courts adhering to the Baughman Approach read the
statute as allowing administrative actions to be the equivalent
of court actions.6
The diligence question is more important than the "in a court"
question. Regardless of the approach taken for the "in a court"
issue, to preclude a citizen suit the government must have un-
dertaken the action in a diligent fashion.6 What actually con-
stitutes diligence, however, is an unsettled issue in the courts."
Nevertheless, when forced to confront the issue, courts generally
determine diligence on a fact-specific basis after reviewing the
totality of the circumstances, particularly the total effort and
results of the agency action.6"
61. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 1985) (Conrail) (stating that in accordance with the plain language of the statute,
a citizen is precluded only if the agency or state is diligently prosecuting an action in
a court; the court, however, did not reach the diligence question because it held the
action was not in a court); Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159,
1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (following the Baughman Approach, the court found that the
agency actions "failed to meet any reasonable test of diligent prosecution"); see also
Snook, supra note 4, at 9 (emphasizing that even the courts most receptive to agency
actions precluding citizen suits require a sufficient level of diligence).
64. Reasons typically cited as causing confusion on the issue include the lack of
any workable standards, such as statutory requirements on the management of an
enforcement case, and uncertainty caused by the general vagueness of the term. See
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 850, 899-901 (stating that the lack of statutory
standards leaves courts guessing as to whether prosecution of a given case is suffi-
ciently diligent); see also Gail J. Robinson, Note, Interpreting the Citizen Suit Provi-
sion of the Clean Water Act, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 515, 530-34 (1987) (discussing
causes of ineffective agency enforcement).
In addition to coming up in section 1365 cases, the diligence issue arises in
CWA section 1319 cases. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(ii); see also supra note 59
(discussing and describing CWA section 1319 and cases interpreting the section). A
review of the case law under section 1319, however, fails to provide guidance on the
diligence issue because the opinions rarely address that issue. See cases cited supra
note 59. The opinions tend to focus instead on the main controversy surrounding
section 1319-the scope of preclusion. See cases cited supra note 59.
65. "In deciding whether the EPA has satisfied [the diligence] mandate, it is nec-
essary to consider the full context of the agency's actions. An evaluation of 'diligence'
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What Does "In a Court" Mean?
The Plain Language Approach
Some courts find that a Plain Language Approach to interpret-
ing the statutory language disposes of the first question in their
analysis of the citizen suit diligent prosecution limitation. In
1985, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Friends
of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail)" using such an
interpretation." Conrail involved a consolidated appeal of two
district court CWA citizen suits raising the common question of
whether enforcement actions by a state agency precluded the
bringing of a related citizen suit.68 Both of the district courts
found that the agency actions in their respective cases were the
"functional equivalent" of court actions and, therefore, precluded
the citizen suits.69 Upon review of the district courts' analyses,
the Second Circuit concluded that, if it were to have accepted the
lower courts' standard, it would have found the agency proceed-
ings were not the functional equivalent of a court action." The
court, however, found the functional equivalence test inappropri-
ate and expressly declined to adop t it.
71
The court reasoned that the diligent prosecution limitation
measures comprehensively the process and effects of agency prosecution." Student
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528,
1535 (D.N.J. 1984) (finding that the agency actions did not constitute diligence),
affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG); see Snook, supra note 4, at 9; see also
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (D. Md. 1985) (finding that
an action is not of sufficient diligence as to preclude a citizen suit when it may be
inadequate to protect the plaintiff fully).
66. 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. See id. at 62-63.
68. See id. at 58.
69. Id. at 61. The functional equivalence test used by the district courts was the
two-step Baughman Approach that is presented in the following section of this Note.
See infra text accompanying notes 89-110.
70. See Conrail, 768 F.2d at 61-62. The court found that in each case the agency
proceeding failed both prongs of the lower courts' tests. See id. at 62. The appellate
court found that the agencies' enforcement powers were much weaker than those
available to the EPA in federal court because the agencies could not enjoin and be-
cause it was unclear whether the agencies could assess penalties greater than $1000
per violation. See id. Furthermore, the court found that the agencies' procedures
were inadequate because of the lack of a right to intervene. See id.
71. See id.
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language of the CWA "unambiguously and without qualification
refer[red] to an 'action in a court of the United States, or a
State'."72 Moreover, although the court found that the statutory
language analysis alone sufficed to support its holding, the court
also analyzed the legislative history of the diligent prosecution
limitation and found no indication that Congress intended any
meaning other than what was "plainly stated."73 As further jus-
tification for deciding that agency actions were not meant to pre-
clude citizen suits, the Second Circuit found that Congress had
shown its ability to provide for such a reading in other environ-
mental statutes and, if that was what Congress had meant, it
would have so stated.74 The court, therefore, held that citizen
suits could be precluded only if an agency had commenced and
was diligently prosecuting a formal action in a state or federal
court.75 Because no formal court proceedings had occurred in
these CWA cases, the court reversed the lower courts and held
that the citizen suits were not barred.76
In Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,7 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit similarly adopted the interpretation that
formal court proceedings were necessary to preclude a citizen
suit.7" In Chevron, the court reviewed a cross-appeal of a deci-
sion that an agency enforcement action did not preclude the citi-
zen suit.79 The court began by quoting the citizen suit statutory
72. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1988)).
73. Id. at 63.
74. See id. The statutes cited by the court indicate that agency actions are to pre-
empt citizen suits in the same manner as CWA section 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319-by
deleting the "in a court" clause from the diligent prosecution restriction. See supra
note 59. The statutes cited were the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(B) (1994); the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2) (1994); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) (1994); and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2) (1994). RCRA is the common
name for the 1984 amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992(k) (1994).
75. See Conrail, 768 F.2d at 63.
76. See id.
77. 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
78. See id. at 1525.
79. See id. Just like the district courts in Conrail, the lower court in Chevron de-
cided the case under an analysis that considered agency actions to be the equivalent
of court proceedings. See id.
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limitation language and listing the contentions of the parties. °
The court then reviewed the Second Circuit's Conrail decision
regarding the "in a court" issue.8 ' The court concluded that the
Second Circuit's Plain Language Approach led to a proper
interpretation of the citizen suit statute and, therefore, barred
the citizen suit required formal court proceedings. 2
To summarize, the Plain Language Approach argues that the
language of the statute unambiguously and clearly requires for-
mal action in a court. Furthermore, advocates of the Plain Lan-
guage Approach claim that even a review of the legislative histo-
ry reveals that Congress gave no indication whatsoever that the
word "court" was to mean anything other than its plain mean-
ing.83 To extinguish any lingering doubt as to the intent of the
statutory provision, the Plain Language Approach also finds that
Congress has expressed an ability to provide for administrative
preemption in environmental statutes and had Congress wanted
such a result here, it clearly would have so indicated." As a
practical matter, therefore, the Plain Language Approach for-
malistically applies the statute to the facts of a case and pre-
cludes a citizen suit only when the agency enforces the statute
through a formal court proceeding that addresses the same
wrongs alleged in the citizen suit and in which private citizens
have a right to intervene. The Plain Language Approach, al-
though providing certainty and predictability in its application,
80. See id. at 1524. The Sierra Club contended, inter alia, that administrative ac-
tion could never equate to action in a court. See id. Chevron, however, argued that
agency action could be equivalent to court proceedings and, in this case, the agency
actions were sufficiently comparable to be considered equivalent. See id.
81. See id. at 1524-25.
82. See id. at 1525. The Ninth Circuit reached its holding primarily because the
statute specifically referred to "courts" and made absolutely no reference to any type
of administrative proceeding. See id. at 1524-25. In addition, the Ninth Circuit stat-
ed that Congress had demonstrated an ability to provide for citizen suit preemption
in other environmental statutes; the court found that that fact dispelled any linger-
ing ambiguity about the term "courts" as it was used in the statute. See id. at 1525;
see also supra note 74 (listing the other environmental statutes and stating how
they indicate preemption).
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. See supra text accompanying note 74. In fact, Congress has specifically amend-
ed the CWA so that, under the right circumstances, certain citizen suit claims are
preempted by specific administrative actions. See supra note 59 (discussing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)).
1997] 1559
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1545
is unaffected by either the equities of particular situations or the
potential for creating socially undesirable results.
The Baughman Approach
The antithesis of the plain language approach used in Con-
rail85 and Chevron86 is the Third Circuit's Baughman Ap-
proach,87 which many other courts have expressly or implicitly
adopted.8 The Third Circuit's opinion in Baughman v. Brad-
ford Coal Co. 9 was the first to consider whether administrative
actions could be the equivalent of court action and thus suffi-
cient to preclude citizen suits.9" In Baughman, the plaintiff
brought a citizen suit under the CAA, alleging that the defen-
dant had violated the Pennsylvania Implementation Plan in con-
travention of the CAA.91 In response, the defendant claimed
that a prior Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources (DER) civil penalty action, held before the Pennsylvania
Environmental Hearing Board, precluded the plaintiff's suit.92
The court found that, despite the fact that the word "court" in a
statute usually referred only to tribunals of the judiciary and
not of the executive, "an administrative board may be a 'court' if
its powers and characteristics make such a classification neces-
sary to achieve statutory goals."93 The Third Circuit reasoned
that the preclusion of citizen suits must be viewed in light of the
policies discussed in the legislative history for the suits, specifi-
cally, that citizen suits were intended both to goad agencies into
85. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Conrail).
86. Chevron, 834 F.2d 1517.
87. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 96-124.
89. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979).
90. See id. at 217; Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 902.
91. See Baughman, 592 F.2d at 216.
92. See id. at 217. The earlier agency action resulted in a consent order between
the defendant and the DER. See id. at 217 n.2. The court found that, because the
prior agency action alleged the same violations the plaintiffs complained of and re-
quested penalties "sufficient to deter such unlawful conduct in the future," the prior
agency action was similar to the citizen suit even though the agency action did not
request a direct prohibition of further plan violations. See id. at 217.
93. Id. (citing Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd.,
454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972)).
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more vigorous enforcement and to provide an alternative en-
forcement mechanism if the agencies refused to act." Upon re-
view of the facts, the court determined that the state board
lacked the powers and characteristics of a court; therefore, the
citizen suit was not barred.95
The Third Circuit reaffirmed its position in Student Public
Interest Research Group (SPIRG) v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott,
Inc.9' In SPIRG, the court again faced the question of whether
agency actions could be the equivalent of formal court proceed-
ings, this time under the CWA.97 The district court had held
that agency actions did not bar the appellee's citizen suit be-
cause the actions were not the equivalent of formal court pro-
ceedings.98 Interestingly, the appellee in the case argued that
Baughman did not control because the citizen suit was brought
under the CWA, not the CAA; however, the court found that
argument to be meritless.99 The court reviewed the remaining
arguments of the parties0 0 and affirmed the lower court hold-
94. See id. at 218; see also S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970); 116 CONG. REC.
32,903 (1970) (statement of Senator Muskie). Also cited was legislative history indi-
cating that Congress intended to allow citizen suits "in a manner that would be
least likely to clog already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger govern-
mental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief." Baughman, 592
F.2d at 218 (quoting City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir.
1975) and citing 116 CONG. REC. 32,926, 33,104 (1970) (statements of Sen. Muskie
and Sen. Hart)).
95. See Baughman, 592 F.2d at 218-19. The court reasoned that the board lacked
the capacity to accord sufficient relief and that the board procedures were deficient.
See id. Specifically, the court found that the relief the board could grant was not
substantially equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal court because the
board lacked the power to enjoin the violation, and the board was empowered only
to assess a penalty of $10,000 plus $2500 for each day of continued violation, an
amount roughly one-tenth the penalty available under the CAA. See id. Also, the
court found that the procedures followed by the board were deficient because citizen
intervention was only available by discretion and not by right. See icL at 219.
96. 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
97. See id. at 1132.
98. See id& The district court additionally found that the agency actions were not
prosecuted diligently. See id.
99. See id. at 1136 n.4. Specifically, the court found that in Baughman the two
provisions had been used interchangeably, that the language of the two provisions
was virtually identical, and that no other court distinguished the provisions in the
suggested manner. See id.
100. See id. at 1135.
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ing that the agency actions did not preclude appellee's citizen
suit.'' Moreover, in reaching its holding, the court reaffirmed
its position that when deciding whether an administrative en-
forcement action precludes a citizen suit, the Baughman Ap-
proach was the appropriate test because, if the standards of the
analysis are met, the actions effectively serve the purposes be-
hind the citizen suits.
10 2
Since the two Third Circuit cases, other courts have expressly
adopted the Baughman Approach. For example, in Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 10 a district court explicitly followed the Baughman Ap-
proach to decide a defendant's claim that a state agency's earlier
administrative action barred the plaintiff's CWA citizen suit.'14
The district court correctly stated that the Baughman Approach
required that "(1) the state agency have coercive powers to com-
pel compliance with effluent limitations and (2) there be proce-
dural similarities to a suit in federal court with citizens having
the right to intervene." 1°5
101. See id. at 1139. Although the circuit court concurred with the district court
that appellee's citizen suit was not preempted because the agency action was not the
equivalent of a court proceeding, it did not agree with the reasoning of the district
court fully. See id. at 1137-38. The district court had held that the agency action
was not that of a court primarily because it provided inadequate procedures concern-
ing citizen involvement. See id. at 1137. The circuit court found that procedures
alone were not dispositive; they were "just one of several factors." Id. Nevertheless,
upon review of all the factors, the circuit court did indeed find the procedures inade-
quate (because they did not afford citizens the right to intervene or the opportunity
to participate); however, it also found that the administrative agency lacked the req-
uisite power to accord substantially equivalent relief. See id. at 1137-39.
102. See id. at 1135-36. The purposes listed included goading agencies to enforce
provisions more vigorously and providing alternative enforcement if the agencies did
not act. See id. at 1136.
103. 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
104. See id. at 1413-15. Specifically, the defendant claimed that an Indiana Depart-
ment of Environmental Management (IDEM) action qualified as a court action and,
therefore, the action was being diligently prosecuted. See id. at 1413. The plaintiff,
on the other hand, claimed that the IDEM action was not the equivalent of court
proceedings because the IDEM lacked the power to enforce its civil penalties and
cease and desist provisions without bringing an action in a court. See id. at 1414.
105. Id. The court ultimately found that IDEM had authority to institute a civil
penalty suit for up to $25,000 per day of violation and to request that the violator
be enjoined from continuing the violation. See id. The court, however, agreed with
the plaintiffs argument that the IDEM actions were not the equivalent of court pro-
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In Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc.,' the Maryland
district court expressly adopted the Baughman Approach to the
citizen suit diligent prosecution issue.' In reviewing the
parties' arguments,' ° the court cited Baughman and acknowl-
edged that in certain circumstances agency actions can be equiv-
alent to a court proceeding.0 9 Furthermore, the court found
that "in order to be accorded court status, a state agency must
possess the full remedial powers inherent to traditional judicial
courts.""0
Other courts, although not expressly adopting the Baughman
Approach, have acknowledged the virtues of the analysis by em-
ploying virtually identical logic to decide very similar issues. For
example, the United States Supreme Court, in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,"' used
analogous reasoning to find that the supplementary role envi-
sioned for citizen suits could be undermined by permitting such
suits for wholly past violations."' Although the Court's deci-
sion did not directly address the "in a court" issue of the diligent
prosecution provision, the Court demonstrated that it would be
necessary to preclude citizen suits that interfere with agency
discretion."'
ceedings because IDEM could only enforce its penalties through a formal court ac-
tion. See i& at 1414-15. Thus, the court held that the citizen suit was not barred
because the IDEM proceeding was not the equivalent of an action in a court. See id.
at 1415.
106. 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985).
107. See id. at 1126.
108. The defendant claimed that a prior administrative proceeding addressed the
same concerns alleged in the plaintiffs CWA citizen suit and, therefore, barred the
suit. See id. at 1125. The plaintiff argued that the citizen suit was not barred be-
cause, not only was it filed after the requisite notice and delay period, but the state
agency actions were not "tantamount" to diligent prosecution as required under sec-
tion 1365. See id.
109. See id. at 1126.
110. Id. In the end, the court held that the plaintiffs suit was not barred, reason-
ing that, although the agency had the power to revoke a permit, impose civil penal-
ties, issue orders requiring corrective action, and execute a consent order, the admin-
istrative proceedings were not the equivalent of a court action because the agency
could only seek injunctive relief from a court. See id.
111. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
112. See id. at 60.
113. See id. at 60-61.
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Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the
Act and issued a compliance order .... Suppose further that
the Administrator agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil
penalties on the condition that the violator take some ex-
treme corrective action... that it otherwise would not be
obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, ... then the
Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in the public
interest would be curtailed considerably. The same might be
said of the discretion of state enforcement authorities."4
Like the Third Circuit in Baughman, the Court in Gwaltney be-
lieved that if the characteristics of an agency are such that its
own enforcement will achieve statutory goals, then formal judi-
cial proceedings would not be necessary."5
Perhaps the most surprising court to use Baughman-like logic
was the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co."6 Six years earlier, in
Conrail,"7 the Second Circuit expressly had refused to adopt
the Baughman Approach." 8 In fact, the Conrail decision was
the seminal case of the Plain Language Approach, the converse
of the Baughman Approach."
Nonetheless, in Kodak, the Second Circuit went against its
own prior rationale and used Baughman-like logic to hold that a
citizen suit was not permitted.2 0 Although the court ostensibly
held that the plaintiff could not use a citizen suit solely to attack
the terms of a settlement agreement between the defendant and
a state agency,'2 ' the court's espoused principles and logic also
indicated that the court believed that an administrative action,
if diligently prosecuted and applicable to the same wrong as a
citizen suit, bars the citizen suit.' Specifically, the Second
114. Id. at 60-61.
115. See id.; see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
116. 933 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Conrail).
118. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
120. See Kodak, 933 F.2d at 125-27.
121. See id. at 127.
122. See id.
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Circuit stated: "[i]f the state enforcement proceeding has caused
the violations alleged in the citizen suit to cease without any
likelihood of recurrence-has eliminated the basis for the citizen
suit-we believe that the citizen action must be dismissed."23
The Second Circuit made absolutely no reference to its prior
findings that the statutory language "unambiguously and with-
out qualification" required a formal court proceeding to bar a
citizen suit, that the legislative history gave no indication that
agency actions could ever preempt citizen suits, or that Congress
knew how to write a law so as to preclude citizen suits."
In sum, the Baughman Approach argues that policy consider-
ations require that in certain circumstances agency actions may
be the equivalent of court proceedings, so long as two categories
of factors are satisfied." The first factor is whether the agency
tribunal has the coercive power to compel compliance, particu-
larly the powers to enjoin and to assess meaningful penal-
ties. 26 The second factor is whether the procedures of the tri-
bunal are comparable to those of a federal court, especially the
right to intervene, as opposed to discretionary intervention.'27
The Baughman Approach, therefore, at least in theory, 28 al-
123. Id. In accordance with its new-found belief, the Second Circuit remanded the
case for a determination of whether the agency proceeding caused the violations to
cease with sufficient likelihood of not recurring. See id. at 128. After remand, the
district court dismissed the case without deciding the issue. See Atlantic States Le-
gal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 12
F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993).
124. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir.
1985) (Conrail); see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
125. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.,
759 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG) ("[Blefore an agency proceeding can be




128. This assertion is qualified as theoretical because, in practice, courts generally
have been unwilling to find that the agency actions were sufficient to preclude citi-
zen suits. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that a state agency did not
diligently prosecute a defendant under the CWA and refusing to bar a citizen suit).
But see Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F.
Supp. 345, 351 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[This court is unwilling to find [the state agency's]
efforts to [sic] totally unsatisfactory as to be deemed to amount to less than diligent
prosecution."), reu'd sub nom. Conrail, 768 F.2d 57.
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lows courts to provide justice under the specific facts of a situa-
tion by considering the likelihood that the statutory goals of
compliance and citizen safety are reached in an efficient and
practical manner.129
What Constitutes Diligence?
The next question courts ask in citizen suit diligent prosecu-
tion cases is whether the actions have been diligently prosecut-
ed. Although the issue has yet to be litigated in a court applying
the Plain Language Approach' and is rarely addressed in
courts following the Baughman Approach,"' the legislative his-
129. See Snook, supra note 4, at 11.
130. Although no one has researched the reason for the lack of case law applying
the Plain Language Approach, potential causes include the uncertainty among the
courts themselves as to what approach, they follow; the rarity of agency enforcement
of formal court cases; perceived heightened agency efforts in formal court proceedings
so that potential citizen suit plaintiffs are not encouraged to sue; presumptions by
potential plaintiffs that, if an agency is prosecuting in a court, then the agency ef-
forts will be found diligent; and actual effectiveness of the agency action in a court
such that plaintiffs are not compelled to act. See, e.g., Conrail, 768 F.2d at 63 (stat-
ing that a citizen suit is precluded by a diligently prosecuted action in a court, but
not reaching the diligence question because the court found that the agency action
was not in a court).
131. See, e.g., SPIRG, 759 F.2d at 1139 ("[Tjhe EPA's informal enforcement proce-
dure in the instant case does not otherwise resemble a suit in a federal
court . . ."); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 831 n.3. (W.D.N.Y. 1983)
("[The state agency] may thereafter fail the test of diligent prosecution if it fails to
adequately monitor or enforce the consent order or if it permits new and indepen-
dent pollution law violations to occur."). Diligence is rarely addressed under the
Baughman Approach because the court's finding that the agency proceeding was not
the equivalent of a court often preempts discussion of the issue. See, e.g., Baughman
v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that an agency
action was not sufficiently equivalent to a court, and, therefore, not addressing the
diligence issue).
Courts, however, occasionally address the issue when interpreting section 1319
of the CWA. See, e.g., Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376,
380 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995) (agreeing with the district
court's finding that the state agency was "diligently prosecuting" its action); Univer-
sal Tool, 735 F. Supp. at 1416-17 (finding that the agency enforcement was not dili-
gent). In Universal Tool, the court found that the agency proceeding was not diligent
in light of (1) the agency's apparent willingness to bend procedures for the defen-
dant, evidenced by the defendant getting a consent decree in a single day when the
process usually takes four to six weeks; (2) the defendant's continued violations after
the agency actions; (3) the lenient penalty assessed in the agency proceedings, only
$10,000 total for hundreds of violations which were each punishable by a fine of
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tory indicates that diligence, measured as adequacy, was the
main thrust of the diligent prosection limitation on citizen
suits."3 2 Courts often complain that there is a lack of guidance
as to the meaning of the term,33 but when forced to address
the question, courts typically state that they make the determi-
nation by considering the full context of the agency's actions and
the protection that the actions afford the citizens. 34
For example, in Student Public Interest Research Group
(SPIRG) v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.,"' the New Jersey
district court stated that [an evaluation of 'diligence' measures
comprehensively the process and effects of agency prosecu-
tion."'36 In the case, the court held that the agency actions had
not been diligent because the actions did not ensure the level of
citizen protection required by the CWA."' The Northern Dis-
$25,000; and (4) the defendant's acknowledgement that the citizen suit, and not the
agency action, moved the defendant to comply with its permit. See id. at 1416-17.
132.
It should be emphasized that if the agency had not initiated abatement
proceedings following notice or if the citizen .believed efforts initiated by
the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to file the action.
In such case, the courts would be expected to consider the petition
against the background of the agency action and could determine that
such action would be adequate to justify suspension, dismissal, or consoli-
dation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the court viewed the
agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to consider the
citizen action notwithstanding any pending agency action.
S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 37 (1970) (emphases added).
133. See, e.g., Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("No judicial guidance exists as to what constitutes diligent prosecution.").
134. See id. ("Any such determination must rest at least in part... on the
agency's enforcement record."); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche,
Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.N.J. 1984) ("IW[e must consider
the citizen's complaint of lack of diligence 'against the background of the agency
action.'") (citations omitted), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG); see also Si-
erra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (D. Md. 1985) (stating
that the actions "may be inadequate to fully protect the plaintiff herein and there-
fore would not be so diligent as to preempt the citizen suit).
135. 579 F. Supp. 1528.
136. Id. at 1535.
137. See id. at 1537. The agency action failed to give the protection of the statute
because the Schedule of Compliance into which the agency entered with the defen-
dant was impermissibly extended beyond the date set in the statute. See id. at
1536-37. Interestingly, the court found unpersuasive another of plaintiffs arguments
that the agency action could not be diligent because the agency seriously acted only
after the citizen suit was filed. See id. at 1536. The court said that such a result
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trict of New York, in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.,'3 interpreted diligence similarly, i.e.,
based on citizen protection, and found that the agency actions
were diligent."9 Although implementing an uncommon under-
standing of the word diligence, these holdings show that dili-
gence under the CWA includes an element of citizen protection
and the adequacy of the action in meeting that goal.
In Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 4' a district court
used a more everyday interpretation of diligence, stating that a
determination of diligence must rest at least in part on the en-
forcement record.' The court then reviewed at length the
agency's enforcement efforts.' The court concluded that the
initial agency efforts would have qualified as diligent had the
defendant complied with them, but after the initial efforts the
agency actions failed to satisfy any reasonable test of dili-
gence.
43
Diligence, it is safe to say, is not a concrete standard for
was exactly what Congress intended when it included.the notice and delay limitation
on citizen suits. See id.
138. 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Friends of
the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (Conrail).
139. See id. at 351. Because the court in Clearwater found that the Consent Order
entered into between the defendant and the agency was likely to achieve compliance
with the CWA, the court held that the agency's actions were diligent. See id. The
court conceded that the enforcement might not have imposed the "Draconian mea-
sures" the plaintiff preferred, but the court was unwilling to find the actions so "to-
tally unsatisfactory" as to be less than diligent prosecution. See id. Moreover, the
court found the plaintiffs focus on the penal elements was misplaced because permit
compliance was the goal and the agency action made such a result just as likely as
plaintiffs preferred penalties. See id.
140. 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
141. See id. at 1164.
142. See id. at 1164-66. In reviewing the total enforcement record, the court found
in sequential order that the agency's decision to use administrative procedures was
proper; the defendant and agency entered into a Consent Order and Schedule of
Compliance; the defendant failed to comply; the agency made no formal demand for
compliance; the agency did not initiate enforcement proceedings at that time; after
more than four months, the agency demanded compliance; defendant's violations con-
tinued; the agency fined the defendant $50,000 and again demanded compliance; the
defendant never paid the fine; the agency finally planned an administrative hearing,
but no hearing was ever held; another Consent Order was entered; and the viola-
tions continued. See id.
143. See id. at 1166; see also discussion supra note 142.
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courts to apply. The legislative history for the diligent prosecu-
tion limitation and these cases, however, provide criteria for a
court to consider when determining whether the actions in a
specific situation constitute diligence. To be diligent, actions
must sufficiently ensure that the public is safe from the viola-
tions that the applicable statute seeks to stop; that is, the court
honestly should believe that the actions will bring the violator
into compliance. In addition, a common understanding of the
word diligence necessitates that when, under the facts of the
situation, a violator and/or agency acts unreasonably (a concept
not at all foreign to courts), the actions cannot be found to be
diligent.
Discussion
Admittedly, the practical difference between the Plain Lan-
guage Approach and the Baughman Approach is not overwhelm-
ingly significant because most courts find the agency actions in-
sufficient to preclude citizen suits and both approaches therefore
result in the preclusion of few citizen suits.' As described be-
low, however, permitting agency actions to preclude citizen suits
avoids negative policy effects and furthers beneficial ones. In the
following section, this Note proposes a statutory amendment
that directs courts to permit diligent prosecution of agency ac-
tions to preempt citizen suits. In addition, in lieu of a statutory
amendment, this Note proposes a judicial standard for interpret-
ing the current statutory language that equitably balances the
beneficial policy concerns of preemption by agency actions and
the competing approaches to statutory language.
Proposal
This Note proposes deletion of the "in a court" clause from the
144. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.,
735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding agency proceeding not sufficient to satis-
fy diligent prosecution requirement so as to preclude citizen suit). But see Hudson
River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (finding that the diligent prosecution requirement was satisfied because defen-
dant was in compliance with consent order), rev'd sub nom. Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (Conrail).
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provision. This slight alteration of the statutory language, which
has been implemented in various environmental statutes, directs
courts to hold that diligently prosecuted agency actions preempt
citizen suits. " 5 Furthermore, as addressed below, such a
change does not compromise the ultimate goal of environmental
legislation-citizen safety-and, in fact, it controls suspect policy
concerns while furthering useful ones.
For various reasons, however, an amendment of the current
statutory language may not be forthcoming. 4 ' Under the cur-
rent statutory language, a court addressing a preemption case
likely will find that a citizen suit is not precluded, either based
on the Plain Language Approach's statutory construction argu-
ment or based on the Baughman Approach plus a finding that
the agency actions were not -"substantially equivalent" to court
actions. One of the reasons that courts using the Baughman Ap-
proach are not likely to find agency actions "substantially equiv-
alent" is the lack of guidance as to when agency actions meet
this criterion. " 7
To promote the beneficial policy results of agency actions pre-
empting citizen suits, this Note proposes an analysis that pro-
vides more guidance than does the Baughman Approach's sub-
stantial equivalence test. Although the proposed analysis follows
the Baughman Approach substantially, it also evokes the strong
statutory construction argument that favors the Plain Language
Approach. The analysis is: permit diligently prosecuted agency
actions to bar citizen suits, but only when the agency proceeding
is "convincingly court-like." Criteria for determining "convincing-
ly court-like" are, at a minimum, that the agency have authority
to enjoin the violator as well as power to grant relief equal to or
greater than that available in a court, 4 ' and that citizens have
145. See discussion supra notes 59, 74.
146. For example, the conservative nature of the current Congress indicates that
Congress may not be receptive to statutory amendments, particularly ones that lead
to greater agency action and potential interference with business. See Cindy
Skrzycki, Slowing the Flow of Federal Rules: New Conservative Climate Chills
Agencies' Activism, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at Al.
147. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 530-34.
148. If the ultimate administrative penalty incurred were less than that required in
a formal court proceeding, it would not preclude a finding that the proceeding is
convincingly court-like because "lilt would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find
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a right and an opportunity to intervene in the agency proceed-
ing.'49 The contemplated benefit of this more concrete standard
is that it will remove a court's reluctance to preempt citizen
suits based on a lack of guidance. These proposed analyses eq-
uitably balance the rights and interests of the citizen-plaintiff
and the alleged violator-defendant. First, the citizens' right to
public safety is promoted because, even if the "in a court" lan-
guage were removed, a requirement that the actions be diligent-
ly prosecuted, i.e., reasonably likely to compel compliance, en-
sures safety. 5' In addition, the analyses further the alleged
violator's interests by allowing agency actions to solve the prob-
lem, thus encouraging a quick and efficient resolution.
Policy Considerations
Implementing the proposed analyses to allow preemption of
citizen suits by agency actions also advances some important
policy goals. The policy considerations examined include possible
interference with agency discretion, frivolous and harassing citi-
zen suits, duplicate enforcement, and risk of inconsistent en-
forcement.
Interference with Agency Discretion
Because administrative agencies have expertise in highly
technical areas and because Congress writes statutes giving an
agency primary enforcement authority, agencies should have
discretion to implement the strategies that they believe best ef-
fectuate statutory goals.' 5' Requiring a formal court proceed-
failure to diligently prosecute simply because [the defendant] prevailed in some fash-
ion or because a compromise was reached." Arkansas Wildlife Fed. v. ICI Americas,
Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Con-
tract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (D. Conn. 1986)).
149. The main difference between the Baughman Approach's "substantially equiva-
lent" test and the proposed "convincingly court-like" standard is that the proposed
test provides more concrete requirements. The proposed standard requires the
agency's remedial powers to be equal to or greater than those of a court, as opposed
to the less definite equivalence standard. Moreover, the proposed analysis unambigu-
ously requires both the chance and the right to intervene, again in contrast to mere-
ly requiring the procedures to be equivalent.
150. Assuming, of course, that compliance with the standards is safe.
151. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) ("The agency is far better
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ing, the most harsh enforcement method, as opposed to possibly
less stringent but more efficient administrative proceedings,
interferes with an agency's or state's discretion.'52 Cited ra-
tionales for why an agency or state might implement enforce-
ment means that are less restrictive than a formal court pro-
ceeding include: (1) the realization that a particular standard
was overly strict because it was based on broad congressionally-
set technology-based standards of performance; 5' (2) a record
of steady and impressive progress with due consideration given
to other discretionary factors;.. (3) countervailing state consid-
erations of gaining industry trust and support to meet other
state-initiated environmental goals;'55 (4) considerations of in-
terstate cooperation to meet regional goals; 5 6 and (5) the fact
that agency agreements generally offer a satisfactory solution to
the underlying environmental concern that protects the public at
a small fraction of the costs of litigation.5 '
In addition to obstructing discretion as to the type of enforce-
ment to implement, citizen suits can interfere with state or agen-
cy discretion as to what sites to address. 5 ' Once a citizen suit is
initiated, an agency can choose to initiate its own action, inter-
vene in the citizen suit action, or take no action at all."9 The
practical effect of this choice is that the agency must address the
concern raised in the citizen suit or lose that opportunity forever.
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper
ordering of its priorities."); Blomquist, supra note 4, at 410 (stating that agencies or
states use professionals with specialized understanding of unique socioeconomic and
geophysical considerations); Snook, supra note 4, at 11-12.
152. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 409-10. Requiring a court proceeding for en-
forcement, instead of seeking to resolve the disputes by informal negotiation, media-
tion, or less restrictive agency compliance orders, causes agency and state goals of
reasonable enforcement to yield to the pressure of pursuing the harshest enforcement
methods available. See id.; Snook, supra note 4, at 11-12.
153. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 410.
154. See id. Discretionary factors cited include financial resources of the discharger
and the seriousness of the violations. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Snook, supra note 4, at 7, 11-12.
158. See id. at 3.
159. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 45-49; Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 897;
Snook, supra note 4, at 3. The opportunity for the agency to choose a course of ac-
tion is the purpose of the notice and delay limitation provision. See supra note 54.
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Also, exercising its intervention right precludes an enforcing
agency from using administrative responses, thereby forcing the
agency to allocate substantial amounts of scarce resources to join
in an often-times long and complex court battle. 6 ' Moreover,
the agency may have already considered the environmental con-
cern of the citizen suit but decided it was a low priority, better
addressed by an administrative enforcement method that con-
sumes fewer agency resources than a formal court action. 6' In
practice, various courts have noted these policy concerns when
choosing to implement the Baughman Approach.' 6'
The primary argument in favor of limiting agency discretion is
the belief that agencies do not always enforce the statute as
strictly as Congress intended.'63 In fact, as stated above, one of
the foundations and original purposes of citizen suits was to
goad agencies into acting when they otherwise were not.' The
argument against exclusive agency enforcement includes the
following rationales: delay in agency actions; lobbying pressures
from violators; and agency willingness to allow deviations.'65
These reasons, albeit not an inclusive list, have counter-argu-
ments, however, that either refute or severely weaken the as-
serted dangers.
First, although the tendency of agencies toward delay and in-
action may be well known 66 and one of the purposes of citizen
suits was "to stir slumbering agencies and to circumvent bureau-
cratic inaction, " 67 the risk of possible delays in agency actions
is no worse than judicial system inefficiencies and the concom-
itant delays in enforcement incurred while waiting for court
160. See Snook, supra note 4, at 3.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 755 F.
Supp. 484, 487 (D. Mass. 1991) (stating that the court was unwilling to "circum-
scribe the administrator's discretion to implement a plan that, in his expert judg-
ment, adequately addresse[d] a violation") (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
163. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 531-32.
164. See S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970).
165. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 532.
166. See id. (citing Henry J. Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 429, 432 (1960)).
167. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976).
1997] 1573
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1545
action.6 ' At best, such a situation presents a Hobson's choice
of either administrative delays or judicial delays.
Second, Congress predicted the danger of passive agency en-
forcement caused by political pressure from certain interest
groups 69 and addressed it with the citizen suit mechanism
itself and its statutory procedural safeguards. 7 ° As a logical
outgrowth of the fear that .agencies would be unduly sympathet-
ic to the regulated industries because of an imbalance of inter-
ests represented in agency decision making, citizen suits give
the public the right to be heard in enforcement decisions and
provide for expense reimbursement. 7'
Lastly, the argument concerning agency willingness to allow
deviations in enforcement loses considerable force when it is re-
membered that Congress in the past has thought it prudent to
give discretional deviation options to agencies.'72 In fact, the
Supreme Court has held that an agency could grant a variance
properly, even when statutory requirements may not be met.'7'
Therefore, because the dangers of more deferential review are
not completely justified, permitting at least some agency discre-
tion to choose what enforcement actions to take and where to
168. See Snook, supra note 4, at 7. While a court action is ongoing, a temporary
injunction may or may not issue to stop any current violations until formal court
proceedings can be instituted. These actions delay implementation of any enforce-
ment or compliance plan, possibly allowing future polluting activities and, at worst,
if the polluter prevails in court, ensure that no enforcement activities are ever im-
plemented.
169. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 533 (stating that "[a]gencies under pressure from
violators tend to delay enforcement proceedings or to overlook certain violations").
170. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 843-44.
171. See id. at 844; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), (d) (1994) (giving citizens
the right to intervene and authorizing the payment of litigation costs to substantial-
ly prevailing parties).
172. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3) (1994) (providing for certain waivers that may
be granted by the agency with respect to emissions standards).
173. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), cited
in Robinson, supra note 64, at 533-34; see also James N. Cohan, Comment, Enforce-
ment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 10 URB. L. ANN. 297, 308-11 (1975)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's Train opinion for ignoring the principle of
nondegradation by approving a dispersion enhancement strategy, which the author
believed would actually increase pollution). Concededly though, exercise of discretion
that patently exceeds statutory mandates is not permitted. See Student Pub. Interest
Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1536-37
(D.N.J. 1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (SPIRG).
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take them is a preferable policy. The preclusion of citizen suits
when an agency or state actively pursues enforcement either by
formal court or administrative actions addresses this policy con-
cern. In addition, the requirement of diligent prosecution allevi-
ates the possible danger that the agency actions may not ade-
quately protect the public. In sum, permitting diligently prose-
cuted administrative actions to preclude citizen suits minimizes
interference with agency discretion.
Frivolous and Harassing Citizen Suits
Another policy concern is that citizen-plaintiffs will bring a
multitude of frivolous and harassing suits that will clog the al-
ready overburdened courts. 74 Although Congress made clear
that it wanted to encourage citizen suits when justified, it also
clearly expressed its belief that meritless citizen suits should not
be brought.'75 The statutory mechanisms typically cited as pro-
tecting against frivolous suits are twofold: one statutory provi-
sion awards litigation costs to the prevailing party,'76 and
another precludes civil penalty awards from going to the citi-
zens. 77 These mechanisms are flawed, however, because they
do not adequately address the danger and because they impli-
cate other critical policy concerns.
As Congress has pointed out and others have noted, the dan-
ger of possibly having to pay the defendant's litigation costs is
likely to discourage frivolous and harassing suits.78 The same
174. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 5.
175. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text; see also Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (Conrail) (stating that citizen
suits "are not to be treated as nuisances . . . but rather as welcomed participants"
in the enforcement of environmental laws); Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 839,
846 (stating that courts need to control inventive litigants' attempts to use citizen
suits for purposes not intended by Congress, yet still keep citizen suits fairly easy to
bring and to prove; also noting both that the inclusion of citizen suit provisions re-
flects skepticism over the prospect of government enforcement, and that the citizen
suit provisions indicate some congressional caution about giving private parties the
power to enforce regulatory statutes).
176. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994).
177. See id. § 1365(a); Robinson, supra note 64, at 527-28.
178. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 528 ("Congress acknowledged that frivolous
and harassing citizen suits could be deterred by awarding litigation costs to defen-
dants in such cases.") (citing S. REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLA-
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provision, however, may award litigation costs to the plain-
tiff.179 Theoretically then, plaintiffs might be encouraged, or at
least not discouraged as much, to bring a questionable citizen
suit. Commentators have argued, however, that because citizens
must bear the initial expense themselves, the provision would
not encourage them to bring suits that they otherwise would not
bring.' This initial expense argument implicates another poli-
cy concern that, when combined with the above-described inter-
ference with agency discretion concern, is critically important.
The implication is that only citizens with the means to retain
counsel and absorb the initial costs of litigation will be able to
bring citizen suits.'' In addition, once an agency commences a
citizen suit, its resources must become focused on the concern of
the citizen suit, regardless of the agency's opinion on the signifi-
cance of the environmental danger presented. This is so because
the agency is forced either to intervene or to lose any voice in
the enforcement action.182 This can result in the unwelcome
situation where a minor problem in an affluent community ab-
sorbs significant agency resources, while a more critical environ-
mental concern in a less wealthy neighborhood remains unad-
dressed because the citizens lack political clout and cannot ab-
sorb the initial costs of litigation.'' Thus, not only are agency
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 54, at 1415, 1499 ('[Clourts may award costs of litiga-
tion . . . whenever the court determines that such action is in the public interest.
The court could thus award costs of litigation to defendants where the litigation was
obviously frivolous or harassing. This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of
the provision.")).
179. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) ("[C]ourt[s] . . . may award costs of litigation . . . to
any prevailing or substantially prevailing party.") (emphasis added); Richard E.
Schwartz & David P. Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the
Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327, 367 (1984) ("Congress sought to pro-
vide for attorneys' fees in two circumstances: (1) to a plaintiff who performs 'a pub-
lic service' in litigation brought under an environmental statute, and (2) to a defen-
dant subjected to 'frivolous or harassing' litigation.").
180. See David Allan Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws
Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 DENv. L.J. 553, 564 (1983) (stating that econom-
ic disincentives may chill a prospective plaintiffs initiative and "[tihe expectation
that plaintiffs may be reimbursed by the court through an award of fees does not
remove the immediate burden of such expenses").
181. See Feller, supra note 180, at 564; Robinson, supra note 64, at 528.
182. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
183. See Snook, supra note 4, at 3.
1576
19971 DILIGENT PROSECUTION AND CIVIL SUITS 1577
resources diverted from dangerous environmental concerns to
less serious ones (as determined by the expert agency), but the
mechanism for determining who receives the benefit of the
scarce agency resources is citizen wealth, a "traditionally
disfavored" classification.' M
The other statutory mechanism used to protect against frivo-
lous suits is the requirement that citizen suit civil penalties go
into the Treasury and not directly to the citizen plaintiffs.'85
This mechanism is weak for a variety of reasons. First, very few
environmental statutes authorize citizen plaintiffs to seek civil
penalties-only the CWA and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).5 6 Second, Congress has amended the
CWA and the RCRA so that diligently prosecuted administrative
actions now clearly preempt civil penalty citizen suits."' Third,
the provision is easily circumvented by negotiated settlements,
in which penalties under federal claims are traded for damages
in pendent state claims."s Lastly and most fundamentally, the
power to award civil penalties in actions brought by private par-
ties has been challenged as undermining important values of the
184. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)); see also Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[A] man's mere prop-
erty status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his
rights as a citizen of the United States.").
185. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 528.
186. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994). Although the ma-
jority of citizen suits are brought under the CWA, 10 of the 12 federal environmen-
tal statutes authorizing citizen suits do not have such a limitation. See MILLER, su-
pra note 1, at 83; Blomquist, supra note 4, at 339 n.3.
187. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)-(B); Cross, supra note 59, at 62. In section
1319(g), Congress dropped the "in a court" language to indicate that administrative
penalty actions preempt civil penalty citizen suits. See supra note 59. Section 1319,
however, applies only to penalty actions; the argument in this Note is that Congress
should extend the preclusion to all types of citizen suits as long as the agency ac-
tion is reasonably likely to ensure that compliance is diligent.
188. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 83. The practice of negotiating payments 'to
plaintiffs, however, has been limited by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3), which allows the gov-
ernment to object to proposed settlements to ensure that appropriate penalties have
been paid. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3); see also Michael P. Stevens, Limits on Sup-
plemental Environmental Projects in Consent Agreements To Settle Clean Water Act
Citizen Suits, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 757, 764 (1994) (explaining that the 45-day no-
tice requirement before the entry of a consent decree would permit the EPA to ob-
ject to any proposed consent decree involving a private plaintiff).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1545
American legal system." 9 Requiring that civil penalties in citi-
zen suits be paid to the Treasury, therefore, is not a particularly
effective protection against frivolous citizen suits.
As shown above, the award of litigation costs and the preclu-
sion of civil penalties awards to citizens theoretically protect
against frivolous and harassing citizen suits. In reality, however,
the protection is minimal and the mechanisms tend to implicate
unattractive and unacceptable policy concerns. Combining these
policy concerns with the real danger of frivolous and harassing
suits indicates that restricting citizen suits is desirable when an
agency action sufficiently addresses the concern. Furthermore,
requiring that the actions be diligent, that is, reasonably certain
to ensure statutory compliance, promotes the ultimate goal of
citizen safety.
Duplicate Enforcement
A further rationale for precluding citizen suits when an agen-
cy action sufficiently addresses the citizen's concern is the need
to avoid multiple enforcement actions against an alleged viola-
tor.9 ' As the Southern District of New York stated, "[t]o re-
quire an agency to commence any form of proceeding would be
senseless where the agency has already succeeded in obtaining
the respondent's agreement to comply with the law in some en-
forceable form."' 9' Furthermore, when the agency action meets
the diligence hurdle, it is the functional and practical equivalent
of a citizen suit, and as such, a citizen suit would result in du-
plicate litigation against the alleged violator for the same factual
concerns.'92 Not only does this raise fairness and collateral es-
189. See Blomquist, supra note 4, at 340 (arguing that the vast powers given by
Congress to private individuals to pursue civil penalties under the CWA are so far-
reaching and uncircumscribed as to undermine some important outcome-independent
values of the American legal system: process, rule of law, and division of legal la-
bor); see also Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 935-57 (discussing and criticizing
the legitimacy of-private enforcement).
190. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 895-922 (analyzing the problem of
coordination between private and public enforcement); Snook, supra note 4, at 9-10;
Robinson, supra note 64, at 529.
191. Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
192. See Snook, supra note 4, at 11-12.
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toppel issues, but judicial efficiency is also significantly im-
paired. An advocate of the Plain Language Approach has posited
that this concern is alleviated by the doctrine of virtual repre-
sentation, which bars a prospective plaintiff from suing if anoth-
er party having the same interests has already sued the defen-
dant.'93 Permitting preemption by diligent administrative en-
forcement, however, addresses the danger of multiple litigation
without resort to the equitable doctrine of virtual representation.
Risk of Inconsistent Enforcement
Related to the danger of multiple litigation is the risk that
alleged violators will be subject to inconsistent enforcement ef-
forts.'" Requiring a formal court proceeding to preclude a citi-
zen suit would result in inconsistent enforcement by
"[B]alkanizing" the enforcement. 5 That is, multiple litigation
would create three separate enforcement entities-federal, state,
and private-for each environmental issue.' Although it is
true that Congress attempted to mitigate these concerns by ex-
pressly providing for agency intervention in citizen suits and by
requiring that citizen suits seek to enforce only the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) standards,'97 these provisions
have offered inadequate protection.9
First, although citizen suits must seek to enforce only the EPA
standards, the focus and concerns of the party seeking enforce-
193. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 529 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v.
Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1980), modified on other grounds sub nom.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1981)).
194. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 895-97; Snook, supra note 4, at 10;
Robinson, supra note 64, at 529.
195. Snook, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref. Co., 852 F.
Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994)).
196. See id.
197. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 529-30. Congress made such an enforcement
requirement in the hope of ensuring uniform application of environmental laws. "The
standards for which enforcement would be sought either under administrative en-
forcement or through citizen enforcement procedures are the same. Therefore the
participation of citizens in the courts seeking enforcement of water pollution control
requirements should not result in inconsistent policy." S. REP. No. 92-414, at 80
(1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 54, at 1498 (1973).
198. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 45-49 (discussing the effectiveness of the notice-
and-delay provision); Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 897-907.
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ment can differ radically. 9' State and federal agencies may
have the same general goals, but they also may differ on how to
implement them and how to handle certain individual environ-
mental matters. °° In addition, citizen groups can have entirely
different foci, ranging from completely localized concerns to
broad policy issues.2' Also, as indicated in the discussion of in-
terference with agency discretion, °2 conflicting motives can
force an agency to allocate resources to an environmental concern
that the agency considered but deemed to be of low priority. Most
significantly, however, the notice and delay provision, which
Congress included to allow the EPA an opportunity to intervene,
has not provided enough time for the EPA to analyze the situa-
tion adequately and decide whether to intervene.0 3
Primarily for the final reason, the existing statutory provi-
sions do not ensure uniform enforcement. Precluding citizen
suits by diligently prosecuted agency actions, on the other hand,
does ensure uniform enforcement by guaranteeing that the enti-
ty with the greatest expertise, the agency, has control over the
enforcement when the agency deems it necessary.
Resolving Judicial Confusion
For the policy reasons described above, allowing diligently
prosecuted agency actions to preempt citizen suits is the pre-
ferred approach. Furthermore, as described in this Note's pro-
posal,"4 the desired means of implementing the approach is by
amending the statutory language. Such an amendment would
resolve any judicial confusion on the issue. To reiterate, the pri-
199. See Snook, supra note 4, at 10.
200. See id.
201. Cf id. (addressing the contrasting goals of citizen groups and governmental
enforcement agencies).
202. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
203. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 45-49 (stating that the time necessary for EPA
to prepare a referral and for Department of Justice to file "almost always will take
much longer than 60 days"); Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 3, at 897-907 (The
principal reason why the notice-and-preclusion system has not functioned as original-
ly intended is that sixty days is not sufficient time in most cases to process a refer-
ral package [between the EPA and the Department of Justice] who actually files the
case."); supra note 54.
204. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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mary proposal is to amend the statutory language of the citizen
suit diligent prosecution limitation to omit the "in a court"
phrase, thereby directing courts to permit diligently prosecuted
agency actions to preempt citizen suits. In lieu of a statutory
amendment, however, the proposed convincingly court-like stan-
dard offers a means of providing courts with more guidance, per-
haps leading courts to find preclusion in more cases." 5
Conclusion
This Note's proposal offers greater benefits and fewer dangers
than the current judicial interpretations of the citizen suit dili-
gent prosecution limitation. Whereas the strict Plain Language
Approach has appealing clarity and simplicity in its implementa-
tion, the approach also poses very unappealing dangers, such as
possible frivolous and harassing citizen suits clogging courts,
multiple and possibly conflicting enforcement efforts, and poten-
tial interference with agency discretion. On the other hand, the
Baughman Approach, although lacking some clarity, sufficiently
addresses the dangers of the Plain Language Approach, and eq-
uitably balances the rights and interests of the parties involved.
Under the current statutory language, however, the Baughman
Approach has its own problems, in particular the strength of the
205. In fact, adoption of this analysis or a similar one by the Supreme Court is not
wholly unlikely. The Court has stated in dicta that preemption of a citizen suit would
be proper if the suit interfered with agency discretion. See Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987). Despite the Court's
dicta, however, indications from the current Court's view of statutory interpretation
suggests that the Court would be unwilling to accept such a reading of the current
statutory language. For example, in deciding to use a Plain Language approach in
1985, the Second Circuit used as support the Supreme Court's statements that "lilt is
a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'"
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (Con-
rail) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980), and citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). The Sec-
ond Circuit further relied on a Supreme Court statement that if a court interprets
statutory language as unambiguous, "judicial inquiry is complete except in 'rare and
exceptional circumstances'." Conrail, 768 F.2d at 62-63 (quoting Garcia v. United
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (citation omitted)). Such strong language indicates that
the Court would be reluctant to permit even a logical extension of the statute beyond
the plain meaning of the language included by Congress.
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statutory construction argument against it, and the lack of stan-
dards for determimng when agency actions are eqmvalent to
court proceedings. The proposed statutory amendment, which
unambiguously directs that citizen suits may be barred by agen-
cy proceedings, effectuates the goals of the statutes, avoids dam-
aging consequences while furthering beneficial policy consider-
ations, and protects the rights and interests of all the parties
involved. In the absence of a statutory amendment, a convinc-
ingly court-like analysis, which requires that the agency pro-
ceeding, at a ninmum, have the authority to accord relief equal
to or greater than that available to the EPA in a federal court
and have procedures equal to those available in a federal court,
addresses the problems of the current approaches and attempts
to implement the beneficial policies that preempting citizen suits
by diligently prosecuted agency actions offers.
Derek Dickinson
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